Synergy means working together, operating together as in Co-Operation, laboring together as in Co-Laboration, acting together as in Co-Action. The goal of synergic union is to accomplish a larger or more difficult task than can be accomplished by individuals working separately. We are committed to a world where I win, you win, others win and the Earth wins. Win-Win-Win-Win.
Peter A. Corning, Ph.D.
It is one of the paradoxes of our age that as the tools of scientific research have grown ever more powerful—from positron emission tomography to electron microscopy, nuclear magnetic resonance and massively parallel computers—the phenomena we are able to investigate (and their causal dynamics) seem to grow ever more complex. The relentless reductionism of particle physics, polymer chemistry, molecular biology and neurobiology, among other disciplines, has not (so far) revealed the decisive “mechanisms” or underlying “laws” of the phenomenal world. Instead, the “microcosmos” (to borrow Lynn Margulis’s term) displays profound complexity, interactionism, interrelatedness and, not least, historical specificity.
It has been suggested that our era should be called “the age of complexity.” While this sobriquet (or epithet, depending on your values) may be appropriate, complexity is certainly not a newly discovered aspect of the natural world.1 The debate over “wholes” and “parts” (or holism and reductionism) can be traced at least to Periclean Athens and to the writings, especially, of Aristotle. Although scholars these days have a propensity for forgetting their forebears, over the course of this century there have been successive waves of holistic and reductionist theorizing—a sort of transgenerational dialectic—in which many of our most distinguished scientists have played a part. After reaching an apogee of sorts with the imposing theoretical edifice of the 19th century polymath Herbert Spencer (1892/1852, 1874-82), holistic theorizing was all but banished by the supporters of Darwin’s theory, and (later) of “Weismannism” and “mutation theory,” at the turn of this century. However, in the 1920s holism (especially the concept of “emergent evolution”) reappeared, thanks to the writings of C. Lloyd Morgan (1923), Jan Smuts (1926), and William Morton Wheeler (1927), and others. Following another haitus in the 1940s, holism recast as “systems theory” was revived again in the 1950s with the emergence of the systems sciences (see especially Ludwig von Bertalanffy, 1950, 1956, 1968; Kenneth Boulding 1956, 1977; H. Ross Ashby 1958; Anatol Rapoport 1968; Arthur Koestler and John R. Smythies 1969; Ervin Laszlo 1972; and James Grier Miller 1995[1978].) Nowadays, systems theory—which is partial to cybernetics and feedback models—seems to have been temporarily eclipsed by “complexity theory”—which is partial to chaos models and hypotheses of “self-organization.” (Stuart Kauffman, 1995, calls it “order for free.”) However, the two disciplines are really close kin.
What sets the present era apart is the fact that the scientific enterprise seems to be in the process of bridging the theoretical chasm between holism and reductionism; there seems to be a growing appreciation of the inextricable relationships between (and within) wholes and parts, and between various “levels” of organization, relationships which necessitate multi-leveled, multi-disciplinary, “interactional” analyses. (See Corning 1983; Kline 1995; also Polanyi 1968; Anderson 1972; Ghiselin 1981, 1997; Eldredge 1985; Buss 1987; Grene 1987; Maynard Smith and Szathm·ry 1995; Miller 1995/1978.) Witness Francis Crick (1994), a Nobel Laureate (for the double helix) and a reformed arch-reductionist, who now embraces the phenomenon of emergence in his recent book on the nature of “consciousness” (see below). Indeed, the very terms “mechanism” and “laws” seem increasingly to be naive formulations in light of the enormously complex, dynamic processes that we can observe (and model) in ever more sophisticated ways. Consider just a few examples: quantum non-locality and quantum entanglement in physics; the highly conserved homeobox domain, consisting of some 60 amino acids, which plays a key role in morphogenesis; the awesome functional organization of the human immune system, which includes at least nine different subsystems; the elaborate cortical substrate of human vision, which involves many millions of neurons and at least 20 distinct visual areas; the intricate relationships and multi-leveled feedback processes associated with even a relatively simple ecosystem; the daunting interconnections between world population growth, technology, economic activity and vested political interests and rivalries, on the one hand, and the problems of environmental pollution, habitat destruction and resource depletion.
There have been many efforts in recent years to gain greater theoretical control over this overwhelming complexity. Best known, perhaps, are the non-linear dynamical systems models that are capable of exploiting the computing power of super-computers. (See Yates et al.,1987; Kauffman 1993, 1995; Holland 1992, 1995; TK and TK.) This has proven to be a fertile and productive enterprise, and we can at present barely glimpse its ultimate potential. For instance, computer scientist John H. Holland is involved in an ambitious attempt to model the evolution, aggregate behavior (emergence) and anticipation (purposiveness and cybernetic feedback processes) of what he characterizes as “complex adaptive systems.” (See also Chauvet, 1993.)
On the Concept of Synergy
Here we will describe a complementary approach. It involves, in effect, a conceptual revisioning of the phenomenal world—a paradigm shift—which directs our attention to an underlying causal principle that is concerned with structural and functional relationships of various kinds and with the concrete consequences, or effects that they produce. Albert Einstein many years ago observed that “we should make things as simple as possible, but not simpler.” Theoretical simplifications, or generalizations, may serve to identify key features, common properties, or important relationships among various phenomena. Equally important, a concept which encompasses a broad range of phenomena may also serve as the anchor for a theoretical framework which, in turn, may catalyze specific hypotheses, predictions or tests.
One example is the concept of natural selection. Evolutionists often speak metaphorically about natural selection (as did Darwin himself) as if it were an active selecting agency, or a mechanism. But in fact natural selection is an “umbrella” category that refers to whatever functionally-significant factors (as distinct from, say, stochastic or teleological influences) are responsible in a given context for causing the differential survival and reproduction of genes, genic “interaction systems” (in Sewall Wright’s term), genomes, groups, populations and species. Genes are the units that are selected, but it is the functional consequences of the genes that (by and large) determine their ultimate fate. (The “classical” population genetics definition of natural selection as a change in gene frequencies in a population is—as Wimsatt, 1980, has pointed out—inadequate because it focusses on the informational and “bookkeeping” aspect of a larger, iterative functional process.)
Accordingly, as a theory of evolutionary change natural selection makes no global predictions about the overall course of evolution or the future of any given species, in contrast with various “orthogenetic” or law-like theories of evolution. Nevertheless, the concept leads to many situation-specific explanations, predictions and postdictions about the properties of various organisms, about the relationships among species (and between any species and its environment) and about the causes of various directional changes through time.
Another example of an “umbrella” term is the concept of hierarchies. The basic principle was well understood by Aristotle, and by the 19th century taxonomists and evolutionists, but the term itself apparently traces to the turn of this century (reviewed in Grene, 1987). Today the term is used in a variety of ways, with each usage having its own theoretical connotations. (See the discussions in Weiss 1971; Pattee 1973; and the references for multi-levelled organization cited above.) Thus, the postulate of a taxonomic hierarchy, which entails a classification of various species into more inclusive groupings (genera, families, orders, etc.), also implies that a given species has certain characteristics and evolutionary relationships in common with (or different from) other species, both extant and extinct. The physiologists, in contrast, associate the term hierarchy with organelles, cells, tissues, organs, etc., a scheme which implies a nested set of functional parts-wholes relationships. Likewise, to political scientists a hierarchy refers to structured relationships of power, rule or authority—to different “levels” of cybernetic (political) control. And when biologists Niles Eldredge and Stanley Salthe (1984) drew a distinction between “genealogical” and “ecological” hierarchies in nature, they were also implicitly making certain claims about the causal dynamics of the evolutionary process (see also Ghiselin 1981, 1997; Eldredge 1985; and Salthe 1985).
“Synergy” (from the Greek word synergos) is another such umbrella term. Although it is often overlooked, underrated, or misunderstood (or called by a different name), synergy is a ubiquitous and fundamentally important aspect of the natural world. (For an in-depth discussion, see Corning 1983; also 1995, 1996, 1997.) Synergy, broadly defined, refers to combined or “co-operative” effects—literally, the effects produced by things that “operate together” (parts, elements or individuals). The term is frequently associated with the slogan “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (which traces back to Aristotle in The Metaphysics) or “2+2=5”, but, as we shall see, this is actually a caricature, a narrow and perhaps even misleading definition of a multi-faceted concept. We prefer to say that the effects produced by wholes are different from what the parts can produce alone.