Credit Default Swaps –The $55 Trillion Question
Tuesday, September 30th, 2008
Fortune Magazine – Nicholas Varchaver and Katie Benner report: As Congress wrestles with another bailout bill to try to contain the
financial contagion, there’s a potential killer bug out there whose
next movement can’t be predicted: the Credit Default Swap.
In
just over a decade these privately traded derivatives contracts have
ballooned from nothing into a $54.6 trillion market. CDS are the
fastest-growing major type of financial derivatives. More important,
they’ve played a critical role in the unfolding financial crisis.
First, by ostensibly providing “insurance” on risky mortgage bonds,
they encouraged and enabled reckless behavior during the housing bubble.
“If
CDS had been taken out of play, companies would’ve said, ‘I can’t get
this [risk] off my books,’” says Michael Greenberger, a University of
Maryland law professor and former director of trading and markets at
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. “If they couldn’t keep
passing the risk down the line, those guys would’ve been stopped in
their tracks. The ultimate assurance for issuing all this stuff was,
‘It’s insured.’”
Second, terror at the potential for a financial
Ebola virus radiating out from a failing institution and infecting
dozens or hundreds of other companies - all linked to one another by
CDS and other instruments - was a major reason that regulators stepped
in to bail out Bear Stearns and buy out AIG (AIG, Fortune 500), whose calamitous descent itself was triggered by losses on its CDS contracts (see “Hank’s Last Stand“).
And the fear of a CDS catastrophe still haunts the markets. For
starters, nobody knows how federal intervention might ripple through
this chain of contracts. And meanwhile, as we’ll see, two fundamental
aspects of the CDS market - that it is unregulated, and that almost
nothing is disclosed publicly - may be about to change. That adds even
more uncertainty to the equation
“The big problem is that here
are all these public companies - banks and corporations - and no one
really knows what exposure they’ve got from the CDS contracts,” says
Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the University of San Diego and
former Morgan Stanley derivatives salesman who has been writing about
the dangers of CDS and their ilk for a decade. “The really scary part
is that we don’t have a clue.” Chris Wolf, a co-manager of Cogo Wolf, a
hedge fund of funds, compares them to one of the great mysteries of
astrophysics: “This has become essentially the dark matter of the
financial universe.” …
ONE REASON THE MARKET TOOK OFF is that you don’t have to own
a bond to buy a CDS on it - anyone can place a bet on whether a bond
will fail. Indeed the majority of CDS now consists of bets on other
people’s debt. That’s why it’s possible for the market to be so big:
The $54.6 trillion in CDS contracts completely dwarfs total corporate
debt, which the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
puts at $6.2 trillion, and the $10 trillion it counts in all forms of
asset-backed debt.
“It’s sort of like I think you’re a bad driver
and you’re going to crash your car,” says Greenberger, formerly of the
CFTC. “So I go to an insurance company and get collision insurance on
your car because I think it’ll crash and I’ll collect on it.” That’s
precisely what the biggest winners in the subprime debacle did. Hedge
fund star John Paulson of Paulson & Co., for example, made $15
billion in 2007, largely by using CDS to bet that other investors’
subprime mortgage bonds would default.
So what started out as a
vehicle for hedging ended up giving investors a cheap, easy way to
wager on almost any event in the credit markets. In effect, credit
default swaps became the world’s largest casino. As Christopher Whalen,
a managing director of Institutional Risk Analytics, observes, “To be
generous, you could call it an unregulated, uncapitalized insurance
market. But really, you would call it a gaming contract.” …
There is at least one key difference between casino gambling and CDS
trading: Gambling has strict government regulation. The federal
government has long shied away from any oversight of CDS. The CFTC
floated the idea of taking an oversight role in the late ’90s, only to
find itself opposed by Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and
others. Then, in 2000, Congress, with the support of Greenspan and
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, passed a bill prohibiting all
federal and most state regulation of CDS and other derivatives. In a
press release at the time, co-sponsor Senator Phil Gramm - most
recently in the news when he stepped down as John McCain’s campaign
co-chair this summer after calling people who talk about a recession
“whiners” - crowed that the new law “protects financial institutions
from over-regulation … and it guarantees that the United States will
maintain its global dominance of financial markets.” (The authors of
the legislation were so bent on warding off regulation that they had
the bill specify that it would “supersede and preempt the application
of any state or local law that prohibits gaming …”) Not everyone was
as sanguine as Gramm. In 2003 Warren Buffett famously called
derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction.”
THERE’S ANOTHER BIG
difference between trading CDS and casino gambling. When you put $10 on
black 22, you’re pretty sure the casino will pay off if you win. The
CDS market offers no such assurance. One reason the market grew so
quickly was that hedge funds poured in, sensing easy money. And not
just big, well-established hedge funds but a lot of upstarts. So in
some cases, giant financial institutions were counting on collecting
money from institutions only slightly more solvent than your average
minimart. The danger, of course, is that if a hedge fund suddenly has
to pay off on a lot of CDS, it will simply go out of business. “People
have been insuring risks that they can’t insure,” says Peter Schiff,
the president of Euro Pacific Capital and author of Crash Proof,
which predicted doom for Fannie and Freddie, among other things. “Let’s
say you’re writing fire insurance policies, and every time you get the
[premium], you spend it. You just assume that no houses are going to
burn down. And all of a sudden there’s a huge fire and they all burn
down. What do you do? You just close up shop.” (09/30/08)
more…

Korzybski’s Indexing: 






